Language Evolution and Computation Bibliography

Multi-agent reinforcement learning offers a way to study how communication could emerge in communities of agents needing to solve specific problems. In this paper, we study the emergence of communication in the negotiation environment, a semi-cooperative model of agent interaction. We introduce two communication protocols – one grounded in the semantics of the game, and one which is a priori ungrounded and is a form of cheap talk. We show that self-interested agents can use the pre-grounded communication channel to negotiate fairly, but are unable to effectively use the ungrounded channel. However, prosocial agents do learn to use cheap talk to find an optimal negotiating strategy, suggesting that cooperation is necessary for language to emerge. We also study communication behaviour in a setting where one agent interacts with agents in a community with different levels of prosociality and show how agent identifiability can aid negotiation.

The ability of algorithms to evolve or learn (compositional) communication protocols has traditionally been studied in the language evolution literature through the use of emergent communication tasks. Here we scale up this research by using contemporary deep learning methods and by training reinforcement-learning neural network agents on referential communication games. We extend previous work, in which agents were trained in symbolic environments, by developing agents which are able to learn from raw pixel data, a more challenging and realistic input representation. We find that the degree of structure found in the input data affects the nature of the emerged protocols, and thereby corroborate the hypothesis that structured compositional language is most likely to emerge when agents perceive the world as being structured.

In this paper we introduce a mathematical model of naming games. Naming games have been widely used within research on the origins and evolution of language. Despite the many interesting empirical results these studies have produced, most of this research lacks a formal elucidating theory. In this paper we show how a population of agents can reach linguistic consensus, i.e. learn to use one common language to communicate with one another. Our approach differs from existing formal work in two important ways: one, we relax the too strong assumption that an agent samples infinitely often during each time interval. This assumption is usually made to guarantee convergence of an empirical learning process to a deterministic dynamical system. Two, we provide a proof that under these new realistic conditions, our model converges to a common language for the entire population of agents. Finally the model is experimentally validated.

Evolutionary game dynamics have been proposed as a mathematical framework for the cultural evolution of language and more specifically the evolution of vocabulary. This article discusses a model that is mutually exclusive in its underlying principals with some previously suggested models. The model describes how individuals in a population culturally acquire a vocabulary by actively participating in the acquisition process instead of passively observing and communicate through peer-to-peer interactions instead of vertical parent-offspring relations. Concretely, a notion of social/cultural learning called the naming game is first abstracted using learning theory. This abstraction defines the required cultural transmission mechanism for an evolutionary process. Second, the derived transmission system is expressed in terms of the well-known selection-mutation model defined in the context of evolutionary dynamics. In this way, the analogy between social learning and evolution at the level of meaning-word associations is made explicit. Although only horizontal and oblique transmission structures will be considered, extensions to vertical structures over different genetic generations can easily be incorporated. We provide a number of simplified experiments to clarify our reasoning.