Simon M. Huttegger
2011
Language, games, and evolution, pages 160--176, 2011
“Let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech”(Genesis 11: 1). The state of language confusion described in this passage may be understood as a state of maximal heterogeneity: every possible ...
2008
Journal of Theoretical Biology 254(4):843-849, 2008
In signaling games the replicator dynamics does not almost always converge to states of perfect communication. A significant portion of the state space converges to components of Nash equilibria that characterize states of partial communication. Since these components consist of ...MORE ⇓
In signaling games the replicator dynamics does not almost always converge to states of perfect communication. A significant portion of the state space converges to components of Nash equilibria that characterize states of partial communication. Since these components consist of non-hyperbolic rest points, the significance of this result will depend on the dynamic behavior of specific perturbations of the replicator equations. In this paper we study selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games, which may be considered as one plausible perturbation of the replicator dynamics. We find that the long term behavior of the dynamics depends on the mutation rates of senders and receivers and on the relevance of communication.
2007
Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning*PDF
Philosophy of Science 74(1):1--27, 2007
Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game theory. It is argued that an evolutionary approach provides ...