Language Evolution and Computation Bibliography

I define neologism-proofness, a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cheap-talk games. It applies when players have a preexisting common language, so that an unexpected message's literal meaning is clear, and only credibility restricts communication. I show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism-proof; in some games, no equilibrium is.

Asymmetric information games where the informed player can send a costless message (sender-receiver games) typically have equilibria where meaningful communication occurs. We therefore know such `cheap talk' can matter. Still, even when there is no conflict of interest, there are also equilibria where no information transmission occurs. This paper shows that for a class of games with perfectly coinciding interests modeled as asymmetric contests, where players are unsure of which role they will have, only meaningful communication is evolutionarily stable.

This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common-interest games. When there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable. The paper introduces a nonequilibrium, set-valued stability notion of entry resistant sets. For games with partial common interest, the no-communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set.