Network topology and self-consistency in language games

The evolutionary dynamics of language has attracted considerable attention over the last years. Different approaches have been taken, from embodied communicating robotic agents (Steels, 2003, 2000; Hashimoto, 1997) to abstract models of signal-object associations (Komarova and Niyogi, 2004). In the later case, strong assumptions are typically made in order to reduce the potential complexity of the game dynamics, in such a way that analytic results can be extracted. A relevant example in this context is a family of language games involving a well-defined pay-off defined in terms of the structure of the lexical matrix where all agents interact with each other (Nowak and Krakauer, 1999, Nowak et al., 1999; Komarova and Niyogi, 2004; Komarova and Nowak, 2001). This type of games leads eventually to a shared code among agents.

All these models consider a scenario of agent interactions where all-to-all exchanges occur. More precisely, the fitness function measuring the pay-off associated to proper communication is computed by matching the performance of each player with all the others. Real networks involving social interactions do not need to follow such a rule. Actually, it seems clear from available data that social networks are typically sparse and have small world structure (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Small path lengths between agents and large clustering are the two essential characteristics of these graphs. Here clustering refers to the presence of order at the local network level, defined in terms of the probability of finding triangles (Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2002). Network topology largely influences the way information or epidemics spreads through the community, and both local and global properties can constrain the way communication develops and evolves (Solé et al., 2002). It might actually pervade the emergence of complex language traits, such as syntax (Ferrer-Cancho et al., 2005; Solé, 2005).

Here we consider the impact of local network properties in the graph G of agent–agent interactions on language games. As will be shown below, an important assumption of these games, self-consistency, is automatically achieved provided that non-zero clustering is present in a connected network.

Specifically, let us consider a model described by a population of communicating agents, each carrying association matrices linking a set of n signals to a set of m referents (Fig. 1). For our set of agents \( S_i \) (natural or artificial) we have, for each agent \( S_i \), two matrices \( P_i = (P_{ik}) \) and \( Q_i = (Q_{ik}) \). The matrix elements \( P_{kl} \), \( Q_{lk} \) indicate the probabilities that this agent associates object \( k \) given the signal \( l \), and to associate the signal \( l \) given an object \( k \) (here \( k = 1, \ldots, n \) and \( l = 1, \ldots, m \)). The normalizations

\[
\sum_{k \leq n} P_{kl} = 1, \quad (1)
\]

\[
\sum_{k \leq m} Q_{lk} = 1, \quad (2)
\]

are to be expected. Each agent is thus defined as pair \( L_i \equiv L_i(P_i, Q_i) \). Agents themselves belong to a network \( G \) defined by the set of communicating agents (the nodes) being two agents linked if they exchange information (Fig. 1). In previous studies, global communication is assumed: all agents interact between them and thus the graph describing their communicative exchanges is a complete (fully connected) graph or clique (Fig. 2(a)).

A fitness function is defined in order to weight the success of the communication among agents. The total pay-off \( F(L_i, L_j) \) associated to a given pair of communicating agents \( \{S_i, S_j\} \) is defined as follows:

\[
F(L_i, L_j) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k \leq n} \sum_{l \leq m} (P_{kl}Q_{lk}^T + P_{lk}Q_{kl}^T), \quad (3)
\]

which is a symmetric function (i.e. \( F(L_i, L_j) = F(L_j, L_i) \)) and is such that \( F_{\text{max}}(L_i, L_j) = \min[m, n] \).

A key assumption in previous models of emergence of communication is self-consistency: agents understand themselves. This is a sensible assumption, but we can show that there exist configurations able to display the maximum pay-off with non-self-consistent languages: to see this, let us first start with a system composed by two agents. An optimum is obtained provided that either

\[
L_i \neq L_j \land (P^i)^T = Q^j \land (P^j)^T = Q^i, \quad (4)
\]

or alternatively

\[
L_i = L_j = L_A \land (P^A)^T = Q^A \quad (5)
\]

and, for any optimum,

\[
(\forall l)(\exists k)(P_{kl} = 1 \land Q_{lk} = 1) \quad (6)
\]

(the other matrix elements will be zero, consistently with the normalization condition). The paradox comes here: for the first situation there is no relation between \( (P^i) \) and \( Q^i \)
and thus
\[ F(L_i, L_j) = F_{\text{max}} \quad \Rightarrow \quad F(L_i, L_i) = F_{\text{max}}. \] (7)

This implies that \( S_i \) and \( S_j \) can understand each other but might not understand themselves: there is no self-consistency.

The so-called lexical matrix has been proposed, among other reasons, as an assumption to avoid such undesirable result (Komarova and Niyogi, 2004). Under such framework, every agent has a lexical matrix \( \mu_k = \mu_k(s_i, m_i) \), where \( \{s_1 \ldots s_n\} \) is the set of all possible signals and \( \{m_1 \ldots m_n\} \) the set of all possible meanings (Komarova and Niyogi, 2004; Komarova and Nowak, 2001). From the lexical matrix we can derive the \( P_{ij} \) and \( Q_{ji} \) matrices as

\[ P_{ij}^k = \mu_k(s_j|m_i), \]
\[ Q_{ji}^k = \mu_k(m_j|s_i). \] (8)

Under these assumptions, self-consistency is guaranteed if the agents reach the maximum pay-off.

The topology of communication exchanges has not been taken into account in previous studies. There is a large number of possible interaction patterns described by the graph \( G \). Some examples for \( N = 4, 5 \) are shown in Fig. 2. Here we show that such an assumption might not be required in order to obtain self-consistency, provided that the structure of the agent–agent communication graph has non-zero clustering and is not a bipartite graph (see below). Under these conditions, the maximum pay-off is reached only by self-consistent languages.

Beyond the two-agent system, we can consider a more general situation described by a linear chain of agents using two given languages \( L_A \) and \( L_B \). In this case, two neighbouring agents \( S_i, S_{i+1} \) on the chain will have a maximum pay-off \( F(L_i, L_{i+1}) = F_{\text{max}} \) if

\[ (P^{i+1})^T = Q^i \wedge (P^i)^T = Q^{i+1}. \] (9)

This system leads to two possible sets of solutions: either a chain of alternating agents with two languages, i.e.

\[ L_A - L_B - L_A - L_B - L_A \cdots \]

as shown in Fig. 3(a), that are not self-consistent, with

\[ (P^B)^T = Q^A \wedge (P^A)^T = Q^B \] (10)

or a completely homogeneous string sharing the same self-consistent language \( L_A \) (Fig. 3(b)) with \( (P^A)^T = Q^A \). If both solutions hold Eq. (6), they are equally good, with

\[ F = \min(m, n). \]

The previous example reveals that the problem of self-consistency (present in the first solution) is expected to occur. Let us consider the simplest example: a triangle formed by three interacting agents (in other words, the smallest clique that can be defined, see Fig. 3(c)). For this system, it can be easily shown that the only possible solution is

\[ L_1 = L_2 = L_3 = L \] (11)

and thus \( L \) has to be self-consistent. Now, consider a string of agents following Eq. (9). If \( L_A \) and \( L_B \) satisfy both Eqs. (4) and (6), the pay-off of all agents is maximal. Here languages are not self-consistent but every agent and the whole system have reached the maximum pay-off (Fig. 3(a)). If we add an agent linking it to a single randomly chosen agent in the chain, the situation does not change. But if we add a new agent interacting with two neighbouring agents on the string (forming a triangle, see Fig. 3(c)) there will be an evaluation of the pay-off like

\[ F(L_i, L_j) = F(L_A, L_A) \] (12)
Let us assume that the network is not bipartite (i.e. it is connex and it has odd loops), and thus it is such that $\chi(G) > 2$. In such case, two colours are not enough to colour the whole network. This implies that there would be somewhere a pair of connected nodes with the same colour, i.e. a pair $L_i-L_j$. In a general framework, we can state that, if $L_A$ and $L_B$ are not self-consistent and the network displays $\chi(\theta) > 2$, there will not exist any configuration of $L_A$ and $L_B$ able to reach $F_{\text{max}}$. Note that, Fig. 3(a, b) and (d) are 2-colourable networks, whereas Fig. 3(c) is a 3-colourable network. As a natural consequence, we find that if the clustering coefficient is higher than zero, then only configurations with uniform distribution of a self-consistent language will be able to reach $F_{\text{max}}$ provided that for such a network, $\chi(\theta) \geq 3$.

Following this reasoning, we can see that the topology of interactions plays a crucial role in order to reach the maximum pay-off with self-consistency and homogeneity. Specifically, it is easy to prove that, if our $G$ graph is tree-like or has no loops with an odd number of nodes (Fig. 3(d)), then the maximum pay-off does not imply self-consistency. On the other hand, if we have at least one triangle (Fig. 3(c)) or one loop with an odd number of agents, then optimality leads to self-consistency and homogeneity.

Our results have implications for both artificial and natural systems. For artificial systems (see for example Steels, 2003) this is a relevant feature: embodied communicating agents should include self-consistency within their embodiment. But self-consistency can be achieved with simple assumptions about connectivity, simplifying the endowment and learning algorithms of agents. For natural systems (including human language) the interpretation of this result has to be done carefully. Here the definition of the lexical matrix $\mu$ is justified also as a part of the (underlying) cognitive structure of agents (Komarova and Nowak, 2001; Komarova and Niyogi, 2004). However, small-worldness (and thus non-zero, high clustering) is already present in social networks of both humans and animals (Lusseau, 2003; Newman, 2003) and a priori, specific properties assigned to the lexical matrix are not so relevant. This matrix might be better conceived as a byproduct of evolution, somewhat imposed by the architecture of social networks and not as a primary tool in the endowment of cognitive apparatus of such agents. In mapping this type of games to natural communication phenomena, what is in fact necessary to assume is that there are some computational abilities not changing in time and allowing agents to converge into a common code of signal–meaning association. The evolution and nature of this computational endowment is an open question in both linguistics and biology (Hauser et al., 2002).

A final note concerns the possible set of solutions able to reach the optimum. First, the derivations have been done assuming ideal communication, without environmental noise. It is the simplest assumption to begin with. More realistic approximations should consider noise, signal...
hierarchies or effort consensus between agents (Ferrer-Cancho and Solé, 2003). A second consideration has to do with the generality of our result, since we have shown that the architecture of agent interactions impose strict conditions on existence the set of possible solutions. But it has to be seen if, for any arbitrary $G$ graph (including or not including loops made by an odd number of agents), the set of non-self-consistent solutions described by Eq. (10) (Fig. 3(a, d)) is evolutionary stable. Despite such solution is mathematically possible, it might be highly unstable. If this intuition is proved, it would reinforce the idea that the lexical matrix has to be understood as a result of evolution, not as a primary feature of the internal endowment of agents.

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